The primary objective of this paper is to highlight the distinct roles of altruism and of self-interest in the political determination of a public education policy. I assess the relative importance of three factors in the determination of the equilibrium level of this policy: altruism, the impact of public funding of education on social security benefits and its impact on factor prices.
Introduction
In a political economy model of public funding of education, I analyze to what extent general equilibrium effects add to altruism in generating support for public funding of education.
The presence of general equilibrium effects plays a critical role in the findings in Soares (2003 and 2004) . Physical and human capital are assumed to be complements in the economy's aggregate production function. By improving the skills of next period's workers, education increases the return to capital and agents that get a relatively large fraction of their income from the return to their investments in physical capital support higher levels of public funding of education. Furthermore, in a pay-as-you-go social security system, the current level of social security benefits is proportional to current labor income. An increase in the level of skills of future workers increases labor income, increasing the level of benefits of future retirees. So, when voting for an education policy, current middle-aged individuals take into account that a more skilled labor force also implies a higher level of social security benefits.
I study how much of the equilibrium level of public financing of education is supported as an instrument of altruism and how much can be accounted for by economic self-interest. I assess the relative importance of three different incentives for the choice of public educational investment: parental altruism, the impact of human capital on factor prices, and its impact on social security benefits. The equilibrium level of public funding of education increases with the degree of altruism, which plays a central political role as grand-parents vote for public funding of their grand-children's education. But the support for the education policy is always strongly related to its impact on voters' future income, due to the presence of factor complementarities in the production sector and to the economy's pay-as-you-go social security system. Furthermore, choosing policies in an environment where individuals share the cost of children's education with other generations, widens the tax base and increases the return to each agent's contribution. But, because I use a realistic demographic structure, I allow for the possible displacement of the median voter across generations. Unlike in most of the existing literature where the pivotal voter is always a parent, the median voter might not be a parent and therefore care less about the well-being of current students, reinforcing the importance of self-interest in the determination of public funding of education.
I then look more closely at the relation between social security and the support for public funding of education. In recent literature, significant focus has been given to the role that social security might have in motivating investment in human capital. Pogue and Sgontz (1977) , Konrad (1995) , and Kemnitz (2000) argue that pay-as-you-go social security systems can generate political support for public investment on education for its positive effect on pension benefits. In Soares (2004) , the existence of a social security system plays an important role in generating large welfare gains from a move from a community-wide funding of education system to a nation-wide one. In Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999) social security might increase welfare by increasing investment in human capital. Belletini and Ceroni (1999) find that a pay-as-you-go social security system can lead selfish agents to support public investment in infrastructures. Glomm and Kaganovich (2000) , study how publicly funded education and social security affect human capital distribution. Rangel (2003) looks at the allocation of public funds to education and social security as the result of a game between generations designed to implement the optimal allocation of resources when a market incompleteness restricts private financing of education. I show that, even though the impact that human capital has on the level of social security benefits might increase the incentives of the middle-aged to vote for education, social security decreases capital accumulation and output. Moreover, by and large, the impact of social security on the well-being of agents is negative. This is true for any level of social security tax rate in the benchmark economy. However, if the degree of altruism is very low, it can be optimal to implement social security as its net effect on welfare might be positive. While supporting the findings of some of the literature, these results also underscore their dependence on the absence of alternative mechanisms to generate support for public investment on education.
I study these issues using a general equilibrium overlapping generations model where fourperiod-lived agents care about their children's lifetime utility and where both public and private investment in education might coexist. The first generation agents can allocate time to the acquisition of human capital. Human capital is accumulated through an individual education process that in addition to an agent's time takes as input physical resources. Subsequently, agents work for two periods and then retire. During the second period of their lives, agents have children whose welfare they value. This leads to transfers that the young, unable to borrow or work, allocate to education.
With a public education system, the government levies an income tax and uses the revenue to fund education. The public education policy is chosen by agents in a political process.
I calibrate the parameters of this economy to match some long run features of the US economy and compute the equilibrium to determine the level of public funding of education that is chosen by the pivotal voter.
The Economic Environment
The economy modeled is one where, in each period, a large number of identical agents that live for four periods are born. Agents in each generation maximize their discounted lifetime utility. For an agent born in period t this is given by
where β is the subjective discount factor, c i,t+i−1 is consumption and q i,t+i−1 is leisure of an age i individual n period t + i − 1. Agents have f children in the second period of their lives and β a is the discount factor for their children's life-time utility. The population grows at the rate f . The share of age i individuals in the population, given by the measure µ i , i = 1, ..., 4 is constant over time and µ i+1 = 1 f µ i , with
The "momentary" utility function is assumed to take the constant relative risk aversion form of a Cobb-Douglas consumption-leisure index,
where ρ is the coefficient of risk aversion, and σ is the coefficient of consumption on the CobbDouglas index.
The budget constraint of an age i individual at time t can be written as
where y i,t is the after-tax non-capital income of the age i individual at t, a i,t denotes her beginningof-period asset holdings, and r t denotes the rate of return on these assets. The variable e i,t is the physical private investment in education. τ t is a tax rate on capital and labor income. Finally, the variables g i,t and b i,t are, respectively, the assets given by an age i agent to her children and the assets she receives from her parent. Agents do not accumulate any assets in the last period of their lives, so
Furthermore, I assume that children do not have access to the credit market and therefore:
Agents have one unit of time each period to allocate to work, education and leisure. In the first period of their lives, agents can choose how much time they allocate to learning, but they are not allowed to work. I assume that children are not allowed to participate in the political process. In the next three periods of their lives, agents may vote but will no longer attend school. Before her mandatory retirement an age i agent supplies l i,t hours of labor and earns w t l i,t h i,t , where w t and h i,t are the real hourly wage rate per unit of human capital and the agent's level of human capital in period t, respectively. Agents retire in the fourth period of their lives. After retirement, an individual collects social security benefits, ss t . Under these assumptions, the after-tax non-capital income of an age i individual is given by
where τ ss is the social security tax rate on labor income. Children accumulate human capital by going to school. The level of human capital accumulated by each child increases with the time allocated to learning, d 1,t , and the quality of the education service. The quality of the service provided is assumed to be an increasing function of the total level of physical resources invested per "student", e 1,t + p t . Hence, I am assuming that public and private funding of education, respectively p t and e 1,t ,are perfect substitutes. I also assume that public funding of education can be supplemented by private financing (See Clotfelter (1993) for references emphasizing supplementarity of public and private education).
This education process is represented by the following technology:
where the parameters η d and η e are respectively the coefficients of time and physical resources in the learning technology while θ is the total factor productivity of the education process.
As, by assumption, the physical resources parents transfer to their children are the only physical resources available to privately fund education we have:
That is, in this model, parents decide how much to privately invest in their children's education.
The production technology of the economy is described by a constant-returns-to-scale function,
where ϕ ≥ 0, is total factor productivity, α ∈ (0, 1) is the labor share of output, and Y t , K t and L t are the levels of output, capital input and effective labor input, respectively. The capital stock depreciates at a constant rate δ and evolves according to the law of motion,
The effective labor input is given by the number of hours worked by agents in the economy weighted by their levels of human capital,
where N t is the size of the population at time t.
The government implements a social security system. The social security budget is assumed to be balanced each period. The amount of social security benefits, ss t is computed by taxing labor income at the exogenously given rate τ ss and distributing the proceeds to the retired agents: µ 4 N t ss t = w t L t τ ss . I am focusing on analyzing the determinants of education financing, and for convenience I ignore the potentially important feature of allowing for education and social security to be chosen simultaneously. I leave the study of this issue for future research. Alternatively, I could assume that the social security system is chosen in a political process like the one described in Cooley and Soares (1999) which would generate an equilibrium social security system with a constant tax rate. Moreover, the stability of the social security system is supported empirically by Miron and Weil (1997) . 1 Besides balancing the social security budget, the government implements the education financing levels chosen by agents through voting. Given the level of taxation voted for by the greatest number of agents, the government sets the amount of funding so that its education budget is balanced. I assume that the only political decision facing voters in this economy is to vote for a tax on income, τ t , to support the education of young agents.
Equilibrium
In this model the individuals have two roles: they are economic agents that buy goods, accumulate assets, and supply labor, and they are participants in the political process in which policies are determined. I begin by describing the economic decisions given a political outcome function. I then describe how the political decisions that determine this function are made.
Economic Equilibrium
Define X and x i as vectors describing, respectively, the aggregate state of the economy and the individual state of an agent. X = (A, H), where A and H represent the distributions of physical and human capital across agents and
The economic problem of an age i individual at time t is to chose a sequence of private decision variables that maximize the discounted value of lifetime utility subject to her constraints, given a sequence of political outcomes that determine the tax rate in each period. This economic problem can be formulated in the following way: 2
subject to a
I(.) is an indicator function defined as
Υ is a given political outcome function that determines the tax rate on income in each period. So, I am assuming that for each period each agent treats the tax rate as exogenously given. X 0 (X; Υ) is the law of motion of the aggregate state of the economy X. A set of decision functions c i (
; laws of motion X 0 (X; Υ); and value functions V i (x i , X; Υ) are obtained.
Competitive firms maximize profits, which are equal to Y − wL − rK − δK, taking the wage, w, and the interest rate, r, as given. In a closed economy the first-order conditions for the firm's problem determine the following functions for the net real return to capital and the real wage rate:
When I study the equilibrium for a small open economy, we have r = r, where r is the international capital markets interest rate. In this case, the aggregate level of capital is given by K = K DOM + K RW , where K DOM is the amount of capital owned by domestic residents and K RW is the amount of domestic capital owned by foreign residents net of the foreign capital owned by domestic residents. The aggregate level of capital (K) is such that the first-order conditions for the firm's problem are satisfied. This means that any pressure for the domestic rate of return to move away from the rest of the world real interest rate leads to a flow of capital into or out off the domestic economy. In equilibrium, the firms always make zero profits.
Political Equilibrium
I now specify how agents make their political decisions and how the function Υ describing the political outcome is formed.
I assume that agents vote for their most preferred alternative at every stage of the game. Consequently, each agent votes as if she were a dictator in the voting period and a "result taker" in the other periods.
Solving an agent's political problem requires evaluating the utility obtained under alternative values of the current policy parameter, τ . It involves solving for the path of the economy under alternative current policies, which requires predicting the corresponding future policies, determined by the political outcome function Υ(.).
For a given political outcome function, Υ(.), that determines the level of the tax rate on income in each future period, and for any given level of the current tax rate, τ , the problem of the age i agent can be formulated in the following way:
Equations (13), (14), (15), (16), (17) 
A set of decision functions c τi (
; laws of motion X 0 τ (X, τ ; Υ); and value functions e V i (x i , X, τ; Υ) are obtained. Next period's decisions are given by the functions from the individuals' economic problem (12) .
The value functions depend on the current choice of the tax rate and describe the preferences of agents over the current policy parameter. They can then be used to locate the policy choice of agents in each period.
The median voter theorem is used to obtain the aggregated political outcome. Lemma: Let m be the generation where the median voter is located. The aggregate choice will be determined according to:
Definition: A stationary equilibrium is a set of value functions V i (x i , X; Υ), e V i (x i , X, τ; Υ); decision rules for consumption and asset holdings c i (
; laws of motion for the distribution of skills and of capital X 0 (X; Υ), X 0 τ (X, τ ; Υ); a pair of relative factor price functions {W (X), R(X)}; and a political outcome function Υ(X) such that these functions satisfy:
(i) The individual's dynamic programs (12) and (21).
(ii) The first-order conditions of the firm's problem (20) .
(iii) Factor markets clearing: 3K
(iv) Commodity market clearing:
(v) The laws of motion for the distribution of capital and skills, which are generated by the decision rules of the agents, as described by the following vectors:
(29) (vi) The public education system being self financing:
as well as the social security system:
(vii) The consumer problems (12) and (21) being consistent:
(viii) The function Υ(X) being the political outcome:
Welfare Measure
To assess how individuals fare under a public education policy, I construct an equivalent variation measure. I evaluate the utility of a young worker under the education policy and then compute the level of transfers to each young worker of her family required to make her able to attain the same level of lifetime utility in a reference economy. The transfer is optimally allocated by individuals to consumption, savings and education. The compensation to be given to a young worker in an economy without public funding of education and with an aggregate state described by X * , is z such that V (b * 2 + z, h * 2 , X * ; 0) = b V 2 , where b * 2 and h * 2 are the parental gifts, and the skills, respectively, of the age-2 agent in a family where, in each period, young workers get a transfer z. b V 2 is the lifetime utility level of that agent in the steady-state we want to evaluate. The measure of welfare is (1 + r)z/Y where Y and r are the real per capita output and the real interest rate, respectively, in the reference steady-state without publicly funded education.
Calibration
I use the procedure developed by Krusell, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997) adapted to OG models to solve for the politico-economic equilibrium of the economy. This procedure is briefly described in the technical appendix.
To solve the model numerically I must assign values to its parameters. Some are taken from empirical estimates while others are set to fit observations on capital-output ratio, rate of return, hours worked and hours of schooling for the U.S. economy. I calibrate the closed economy version of the model economy assuming that the model period is 20 years long. Agents in this model are born at the age of 0 and become full-time workers at age 20, working 40 years more and retiring thereafter to a total real-life age of 80.
Fertility Rate
The exogenous fertility rate is calibrated to match the average population growth rate in the US economy in the last decades, 0.012 (Citibase Data, 1946 -1993 .
Preferences I set the coefficient of risk aversion, ρ, to 2. I choose the discount factor, β, to be 0.73, so that in the politico-economic steady-state the capital-output ratio is approximately 3.32 (see Cooley and Prescott (1995) ).
I take the coefficient of consumption in the utility function, σ, to be 0.32. This value implies that on average agents in the labor force allocate a third of their time to market activities. Altruism I set the altruistic discount factor to 0.48 to match the average ratio of spending on public primary and secondary education to aggregate expenditures on consumption in the US economy, 0.053, as in Fernandez and Rogerson (1998) ,.
Production Technology
Following Cooley and Prescott (1995) , the share of labor in the production function is set to be 0.6 and I set the depreciation rate to be 6.4% on an annual basis, so that the steady-state investment/capital ratio for this economy is 0.076.
Education Technology
I choose parameter values for the education technology such that the steady-state equilibrium of the model matches some observations for the US economy. In particular, I target the time allocated to education and the elasticity of mean earnings with respect to per pupil spending on education.
The breadth of estimates for the elasticity of earnings with respect to spending per pupil is very wide, its values range from 0.01 to 0.29 (see Card and Krueger, 1996) . In a survey of the literature, Card and Krueger (1996) observe that the average of 25 estimated elasticities is 0.16. However, Betts (1994) indicates that the elasticities tend to be higher when a functional form for the education production function similar to the one used in this paper is assumed. Therefore, I calibrate the coefficient of expenditures on education in the education production function so that the elasticity of mean earnings with respect to per pupil spending on education comes close to 0.2, as in Fernandez and Rogerson (1998) .
I assume that the education technology has constant returns to scale to the factors. I set the coefficient of investment in the education process, η e , to 0.2, and the coefficient corresponding to the time dedicated to the accumulation of human capital, η d , 0.75.
The value for the total factor productivity in the education sector is chosen to replicate US observations for the percentage of available time allocated to education. Juster and Stafford (1991) find that school aged children allocate about 29.41% of their time to school work.
The social security tax rate is set exogenously to 12.8% following Altig et al (2001).
The parameter choices for the benchmark model are summarized in table 1. 
The Benchmark Economy
From a steady-state without public education, the sequence of political and economic choices will lead the economy to a steady-state with public funding of education. The level of the policy parameter that maximizes the utility level of the pivotal voter in the benchmark economy, an age-3 agent, converges to a steady-state value of 0.0596. 5 Table 2 about here Table 2 shows the equilibrium average supply of hours of labor, the capital/output ratio, the levels of income per capita, skills and welfare and the resources allocated to education in the absence of public funding of education (second column) and for the equilibrium tax rate (third column). Public funding of education has a significant impact on the economy: the equilibrium level of human capital increases with the level of public education taxation, while the levels of output and hours allocated to education and to work decrease. The introduction of publicly funded education redistributes resources to the young and to future generations, bringing up agents' utility. 11.66% of per capita income would have to be given to each period's young workers for them to be indifferent between the steady-state without public funding of education and the one with publicly funded education.
In the benchmark equilibrium, altruism plays a central political role. Unlike in most of the existing literature where the pivotal voter is always a parent, I allow for the displacement of the median voter. The pivotal voter is an age − 3 agent who votes for public funding of her grandchildren's' education. As she cares about the lifetime utility of her offspring, she wants to transfer resources from taxpayers to her grandchildren through the education policy.
However, she cares less about the well-being of current students than their parents. But, because with public funding of education individuals share the cost of children's education with the other generations, the tax base is larger, increasing the return to each agent's contribution. This can result in grand-parents supporting higher levels of public education financing than parents would be willing to fund privately.
Furthermore, because the median voter cares less about children's well-being, self-interest might become more important in the determination of public funding of education.
In fact, besides altruism, several other factors play an important role in the determination of the political choice of agents. The presence of factor complementarities in the production sector and the economy's pay-as-you-go social security system motivate support for the education policy purely out of economic self-interest.
In Soares (2003) , I show that in an economy without altruism, because of borrowing constraints and the presence of factor complementarities in the production function, agents that will get a relatively large fraction of their income from the return on their investments in physical capital support public funding of education. The complementarity between physical capital and labor implies that when the labor input increases, the return on capital goes up. Therefore, agents can increase their future capital income by increasing public investment in the human capital of future workers.
Furthermore, the pay-as-you-go social security system strengthens the relation between the well-being of current middle-aged and the skill level of the future work force. In a pay-as-you-go social security system, the current level of retirement benefits is proportional to the current labor income. For a given tax rate, an increase in the level of skills of future workers will increase labor income therefore increasing the level of benefits of future retirees. Even though this effect might be partially offset by changes in the wage rate and the hours of work supplied, current middleaged workers, next period's retirees, support publicly funded education in order to increase future labor income and hence their retirement benefits.
So, besides sharing the cost of their grandchildren's human capital investment with other generations, by voting on public financing of education middle-aged workers can also increase the return on their investments in physical capital and their social security benefits. In addition to the marginal value of public investment in education due to altruism, we have to take into account the marginal value stemming from its general equilibrium effects.
At this point, I find it helpful to quantify the magnitude of the different effects involved in the choice of public education. I start by evaluating the relative importance of altruism and the general equilibrium effects. I then focus on the impact of social security on the choice of public finance of education.
Self-Interest and Altruism
In order to have a better understanding of the importance of the general equilibrium effects of the education policies in the determination of the political equilibrium, I study the sensitivity of the equilibrium level of the tax rate to variations in the altruism discount factor.
To isolate some of the effects that occur, I also compute the partial equilibria for the different levels of altruism. In these equilibria, factor prices and social security benefits remain constant. Hence, the location of the median voter and her support for public funding of education stem solely from altruism.
Figure 1 about here
Looking at the steady-states for economies with different levels of altruism (see figure 1 ) we observe that the equilibrium level of publicly financed education increases with altruism ( figure  1-a and 1-b) . 6 In this model economy, unlike in Soares (2003) , without altruism there is no support for public funding of education. For low levels of altruism, parents care little about their children and prefer very low levels of public investment on education. Because the other generations even care less, in the absence of general equilibrium effects (the partial equilibrium case) the median voter is a grand-parent who cares too little about her grand-children to vote for public funding of their education (see the location of the median voter in figure 2 ). When the general equilibrium effects channel is open, agents also take into account the pecuniary effect of publicly funded education on their income. As parents get a relatively large portion of their lifetime income from labor, they are less interested in this policy as it decreases their future wages. On the other hand, grand-parents prefer higher levels of public investment on education because of its impact on the return to savings and on their social security benefits. Consequently, the median voter is a parent that does not support significant levels of public education. For instance, in this paper's model economy when the altruism discount factor is 0.02, the outcome of the voting process is a very small level of public education. While the choices of the age 3 agents would lead the closed economy to a steady-state with a share of output allocated to public funding of education of 2.59%, corresponding to a tax rate of 3%, the pivotal voter is an age 2 agent and the politico-economic equilibrium converges to a steady-state with 0.9% of output publicly allocated to education, corresponding to a tax rate of 1%.
Figure 2 about here
This indicates that, together with altruism, selfish motives are crucial in the determination of public funding of education. Firstly, self-interest and altruism play an important role in the placement of the median voter. In addition, part of the support for public funding of education can be accounted for by its pecuniary impact on the median voter's income, and not just her caring for her offspring.
Moreover, this example also indicates the importance of constructing model economies with a realistic demographic structure that allows for the displacement of the median voter across generations.
In general equilibrium, for higher but still low levels of altruism, the median voter is a parent and her support for public funding of education stems mainly from altruism. In partial equilibrium the median voter is a grand-parent. As the degree of altruism increases, parents care more for the lifetime utility of their children and vote for higher levels of public funding of education. Grandparents discount their grandchildren's lifetime utility by β 2 a . As β a increases, so does the difference in the degree of altruism between them and parents. Grand-parents support for education out of altruism increases at a lower rate than parents' maintaining the placement of the median voter and increasing the gap between the general and partial equilibria results.
Moreover, the relative importance of agents' own future utility decreases. They are therefore less willing to defer consumption to the future through investment in physical capital and more willing to invest in the human capital of their offspring. This is reflected in a higher level of resources channeled to the young agents' education in the "private education" equilibrium and in a lower level of physical capital accumulation (see figure 1-b and -c) . A lower accumulation of assets means that the impact of the investment in human capital on capital income is also less important, leading to a lower desire by grand-parents, age 3 agents, to support a higher level of τ for its "interest rate effect".
Above a given level of the altruistic discount factor, parents care more about their children and become the agents that want higher levels of public funding of education, displacing the median voter to the grand-parents generation, which discounts more heavily the utility of the current young. The levels of public funding of education chosen by the pivotal voter are a result of altruism and of the general equilibrium effects of the education policy. The impact of the pecuniary effects of public funding of education can be seen in the difference between the equilibrium and the partial equilibrium results.
We can better quantify the importance of the general equilibrium effects by looking at their welfare implications. In figure 1-d we can see that the welfare gain from being a parent in a steadystate with public investment in education instead of a steady-state with only private education decreases with altruism. However, the levels of welfare attained in the closed economy equilibrium are always higher than in the partial equilibrium experiment. The increase in support for public funding of education related to the internalization of the general equilibrium effects of this policy generates significant welfare gains and can make agents better off than in the economy without public investment on education.
Looking at the partial equilibrium results we can see that grand-parents support of public funding of education out of altruism is hardly ever strong enough to generate long-run increases in welfare relative to the equilibrium without public funding of education. The displacement of the median voter to the grand-parents' generation, which discounts children's lifetime utility more heavily than parents, and the distortionary effect of taxation seem to dominate the impact of the "widening of the tax base" effect.
For high levels of the altruism discount factor, the older agents' bequest motive becomes active. 7 Then, as altruism increases, the level of bequests and assets in the economy increase (see figure 1-c) , and we notice that the "interest rate effect" regains strength leading to a slight increase in the support for public funding of education and welfare levels (see figure 1-b and -d) relatively to the partial equilibrium. However, the welfare gains generated by public funding of education relatively to the equilibrium with private education become negative. The selfish motives are still present but are no longer strong enough to overcome the decrease in altruism resulting from the displacement of the pivotal voter to the grand-parents generation and the distortionary effect of labor income taxation.
These results show that, in the presence of altruism towards the young, the general equilibrium effects induced by public investment in education have a strong influence on the determination of the political equilibrium. The relative impact of these effects on the equilibrium level of public funding of education depends on the degree of altruism, but it is always substantial.
Social Security and Public Funding of Education
Part of the support for publicly funded education stems from the middle-aged workers taking into account that, with a pay-as-you-go social security system, a more skilled labor force implies a higher level of social security benefits in the future. This suggests that, by inducing support for higher levels of public funding of education, social security might be welfare improving. In this section, I evaluate the impact of introducing pay-as-you-go social security systems on the equilibrium level of public funding of education and on welfare.
Even though social security should also be treated as an endogenous policy, I want to focus on its implications in the choice of public funding of education. Hence, I ignore the potentially important feature of allowing for education and social security to be chosen in the same political arena. I look, instead, at the impact of implementing a social security system in an economy where the education policy is endogenous. This experiment does not intend to be a realistic representation of the political system, but it is important to better understand the relation between these two policies. This simplification can be justified by assuming that a given tax rate was implemented together with a reputational mechanism like the one described in Cooley and Soares (1999) (see discussion in section 2).
In order to evaluate more completely the impact of social security on the politico-economic equilibrium, I compute the equilibria in a closed economy and in a small open economy. Because I want to study the impact of implementing different levels of social security taxation, in the latter economy factor prices are fixed at their equilibrium levels in the closed economy without social security or publicly funded education.
Figure 3 about here
In figure 3 , I plot the levels of the equilibrium tax rate, the share of GDP allocated to public funding of education, capital-output ratio and the welfare measure for different values of the social security tax rate. The welfare measure gives us the percentual change in the lifetime utility of an age-2 agent relatively to the same economy without social security.
The results for the small open economy (see figure 3) are consistent with the previous section's interpretation. Social security plays an important role in generating support for public investment in education. With a pay-as-you-go social security system, the current level of social security benefits is proportional to current labor income. Given the wage rate, an increase in the level of skills of future workers increases labor income, thereby increasing the level of benefits of future retirees. As we increase the social security tax rate, the replacement rate increases which strengthens the relationship between the skill level of the labor force and social security benefits. We can see in the graph that, when factor prices are constant, the equilibrium levels of the education tax rate and of the share of output devoted to public funding of education increase with the social security tax. Notice, also, that for the benchmark value of the social security tax rate, 12.8%, the support for public funding of education is higher than in the benchmark results. This occurs because I am maintaining the wage rate constant at its level in the absence of social security which is higher than the one in the benchmark results. A higher wage rate, like a higher social security tax rate, implies a stronger relation between the supply of labor and social security benefits.
However, as we can see in figure 3 , the level of welfare decreases with the implementation of social security benefits. The intuition for these results is well known. In an overlapping generations environment, older generations have a higher marginal propensity to consume than do younger generations. The introduction of social security implies a redistribution of resources away from the young to the old. This raises consumption and decrease investment in physical and human capital. So, higher levels of social security benefits stemming from higher social security tax rates reduce the incentives of middle-aged agents to save for future consumption through the accumulation of assets or by investing in the education of the young. Furthermore, the pay-asyou-go social security system also distorts labor supply decisions. The taxation of labor income and the retirement benefits diminishes the incentive of agents to work. The lower after-tax labor income also reduces young agents' incentives to accumulate skills. Consequently, the equilibrium level of labor supply decreases with the introduction of the pay-as-you-go social security system. It is therefore not a surprise that output decreases with social security leading to a decrease in the levels of welfare of the agents.
The link between education and social security benefits introduced by the pay-as-you-go social security system increase the support for public funding of education, increasing the share of output allocated to education not only relatively to the economy without public education but also to the economy without social security. Nonetheless, it is not strong enough to offset the negative impact of social security on human capital accumulation and savings, and it greatly decreases welfare levels.
In the closed economy version of the model, boosting social security results in lower equilibrium levels of public funding of education. The equilibrium tax rate is strictly decreasing with the size of the social security system, except for very high levels of the social security tax rate (see figure  3) . Again, the implementation of social security has a very strong negative impact on investment in human and in physical capital. However, in a closed economy, the decrease in domestic capital is not compensated by an inflow of foreign investment and wages decrease. Furthermore, the role of social security in determining support for public funding of education is affected by the impact of the education policy on factor prices. In the closed economy, a more skilled work force implies a lower wage rate and a reduction in the amount of working time, partially off-setting the direct impact of education on labor income. Hence, an increase in publicly funded education has a smaller impact on the level of social security benefits than in the case where the factor prices were unchanged. In addition, because social security decreases the equilibrium levels of assets accumulated by the middle-aged, the share of capital income in the income of the old is smaller. Thus, the impact of an increase in the effective labor supply on capital income is less important. This decreases the incentives of the median voter to support publicly funded education in order to increase her future capital income.
For the highest levels of the social security tax rate, support for public funding of education jumps up. As social security increases, the return to savings raises while the wage rate diminishes and the bequest motive from grand-parents to parents becomes active. Grand-parents, the pivotal voters, transfer part of the social security benefits back to their offspring through direct transfers and by supporting higher levels of public funding of education.
The results show that even though a pay-as-you-go social security can generate support for higher levels of public funding of education, this effect is more than offset by the negative impact it has on savings and human capital accumulation, leading to very large welfare losses. Agents actually prefer to stay with private funding and have social security eliminated over any other move conditional on a given social security system.
Rangel (2003) and Boldrin and Montes (2002) , look at the joint determination of public funding of education and social security. In their framework, an intergenerational transfer system is implemented that allows for optimal education financing when a market incompleteness restricts private financing of education. The results in this paper indicate that even though the presence of social security can help generate support for funding of education, the cost is too steep and agents prefer to live in an economy without social security even if this implies foregoing the possibility of publicly funded education.
But, if the level of altruism is very low, private investment on education is not significant and the role of social security might become prominent, as in Rangel (2003) . However, in any of the environments studied and independently of the presence of social security, when altruism is too weak age-2 agent votes for extremely low levels of education funding. In the absence of general equilibrium effects, the pivotal voter is an age-3 agent that prefers even lower levels of public funding of education. On the other hand, when age-3 voters prefers significant levels of public funding of education because of its general equilibrium effects, the median voter is an age-2 agent.
For not so low levels of altruism, private financing of education might still not be significant, but, together with the general equilibrium effects, the more substantial levels of altruism might generate support for considerable levels of publicly funded education. This occurs, either because the general equilibrium effects place the pivotal voter in a generation that cares about children, or because, when there are general equilibrium effects, the higher levels of altruism place the median voter in the age-3 generation. Social security might then play an important role in generating support for public funding of education, and the introduction of a pay-as-you-go social security system might be welfare improving. To test this possibility, I run the previous experiments for β a = 0.02.
In figure 4 , I plot the levels of the equilibrium tax rate, the share of output allocated to public funding of education, capital-output ratio and the welfare measure for different values of the social security tax rate.
Figure 4 about here
In this case the "social security effect" is important and support for public funding of education increases with the levels of the social security tax implemented. In both the closed economy and the small open economy, the steady-state welfare peaks for positive levels of the social security tax rate. While for the closed economy, this peak is almost imperceptible and happens for a level of taxation around 1%, in the small open economy it is more obvious and occurs for a higher level of the social security tax rate, about 5%. These results support the findings in Rangel (2003) and Boldrin and Montes (2002) , who suggest that, in an environment where agents are selfish, the simultaneous choice of these policies can be welfare improving. But this paper also shows, that their findings are significantly weakened when there are alternative motives to support public funding of education that preclude the need to resort to the highly distortionary social security policy.
Final Comments
Many current analyses of public education policies rely on altruism to explain support for these policies. The general equilibrium effects of public funding of education are implicitly ignored, because the focus of most of those discussions is placed on the analysis of small communities. The findings of this paper suggest that such approaches may be incomplete and misleading if used to study policies implemented at a wider level. Public education policies have a sizeable effect on the supply of labor, capital stock, the rate of return to savings, and the level of social security benefits.
I show that even in the presence of high levels of altruism towards the young, the general equilibrium effects induced by public investment in education are strong enough to generate further support for public funding of education. The equilibrium tax rate is higher in the economies in which factor prices are flexible, implying that the complementarity between capital and labor in the production function motivates support for a higher level of publicly funded education. When voting for education policy in an economy with a pay-as-you-go social security system, current middle-aged also take into account that, by increasing future labor supply, public funding of education affects the future level of social security benefits. However, contrary to what has been suggested in recent work, even though the presence of a pay-as-you-go social security system contributes to increase the support for public education, the implementation of a pay-as-you-go social security system makes agents worse off in the long-run. This paper contributes to the understanding of some of the determinants of public education while abstracting from some other features that have shown to be important in the determination of this policy. For instance, I assumed away intragenerational heterogeneity because it has been the focus of many theories of public funding of education, where it is often essential for generating support for public education, and it significantly increases the complexity of the numerical methodology. But, more importantly, having endogenized the choice of public funding of education it is natural to also endogenize social security expenditures. Given the results of this paper, it seems interesting to analyze if the joint determination of these policies as the result of a voting process generates lower (higher) levels of social security and higher (lower) levels of public funding of education relatively to an environment where these policies are chosen separately. Middle-aged voters might be willing to vote for lower levels of social security when they take into account the negative impact that it has on education funding and the effect of education investment on their future capital income.
Notes
1 Boldrin and Montes (2002) analyze the joint determination of public funding of education and social security in order to implement an intergenerational transfer system that finances education when a market incompleteness restricts private funding of education. However, they do not look at any of the policies as the result of a political process. Rangel (2003) studies the implementation of public education and social security as the result of an intergenerational game. 2 We drop the time subscript to simplify the notation. A prime superscript will denote a variable from next period.
3 A variable with a hat indicates that the variable is expressed in per capita terms. 4 That is, if agents believe that the political system described by the sequence Υ will be sustained, then the political outcome for the present period will be the level τ such that τ = Υ(X). Their decision functions will therefore be the same as the ones obtained when agents take the whole sequence of policy decisions as given, (see problem 3.1).
Technical Appendix
In this appendix, I describe the procedure used to compute the political-economic equilibria for the model economy.
I apply an approach similar to the one used in Krusell, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997) to solve for the politico-economic equilibrium of the economy. That is the procedure involves linearquadratic approximations. I solve for the recursive equilibria for a given political outcome function, and then I solve the political problem. An equilibrium is attained when the political choice corresponds to the one resulting from the given political outcome function, otherwise the political outcome function is updated and the procedure continues.
The procedure can be described as follows (see Krusell, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997) for a more detailed description):
1. Make a guess on the tax rate on income τ 0 and compute the corresponding steady-state (A 0 , S 0 ).
2.
Approximate the utility functions of the different generations agents around this steadystate with a quadratic function and solve for the value functions of these agents. Start from the old agents' problem and work backwards to the first generation agents' one. As I solve the agents' problems I get decision rules as functions of individual and aggregate state variables, as well as the tax rate.
3. Substituting these decision rules in the agent's problem I get the value function in function of individual and aggregate state variables, as well as the tax rate.
4. Maximizing the value function corresponding to the pivotal voter with respect to the political parameter I obtain a political decision in function of aggregate state variables and individual state variables of the pivotal voter. I can then aggregate this function and obtain a political outcome function that is only a function of aggregate state variables. I iterate on this approximation until I converge to a function Υ 0 (A 0 , S 0 | τ 0 ).
5. Compare the tax rate implied by this political outcome function τ = Υ 0 (A 0 , S 0 | τ 0 ) with the initial guess τ 0 . If the tax rates are different I update the initial guess and go back to step 1. Otherwise, a political and economic equilibrium has been found. 
